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In a fight to protect content from piracy, copyright holders have worked to develop Digital Rights
Management (DRM) systems that are harder to break. The result of these stronger measures of
protection has been to limit the ways that content can be used and enjoyed by legitimate users, even
controlling private performances and displays of digital forms of content. DRM systems make it pos-
sible for content owners to limit fair use rights further than allowed under Copyright Law—effectively
strengthening these laws in their favor. In addition to the problems with fair use, privacy issues have
been raised by DRM technologies that collect user data. This paper begins with a brief overview
of how DRM technologies are being used to limit consumer rights. Next it is shown how this code
is combined with a legal component, including the use of contractual agreements, to further narrow
user rights. Providing a summary of the legal history, it builds up to the current legal environment
surrounding DRM in the US. It concludes with my proposal for how DRM policies should be changed
to better balance the interests of copyright holders and the public.
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1 Topic Description and Importance
In a fight to protect content from piracy, copyright holders have worked to develop Digital Rights
Management (DRM) systems that are harder to break. Robustness against attack is often considered
a top priority for DRM designers, as content distributors argue that it only takes one user able to gain
unauthorized access to content for it to be illegally shared with many others on the Internet, such as
through peer-to-peer file sharing. Some security experts believe that no form of DRM can ever be
100% secure and that attempts to ensure that copying will not happen are futile, while others strive to
create more “draconian” systems that make it impossible to circumvent DRM rules [6]. Several DRM
experts have argued that users should instead be motivated to accept DRM through the inclusion
of value-added components in DRM-protected content to gain consumer acceptance, such as better
content delivery, quality, and management as compared to their pirated counterparts.
The trend of DRM, however, is on increasing restrictions, often without offering any intrinsic motiva-
tion to accept the technology. The result of these stronger measures of protection has been to limit the
ways that content can be used and enjoyed by legitimate users, even controlling private performances
and displays of digital forms of content. DRM systems make it possible for content owners to limit
fair use rights further than allowed under Copyright Law—effectively strengthening these laws in their
favor [1, 22,28,67,68,70].
In addition to the problems with fair use, privacy issues have been raised by DRM technologies
that collect user data. Examples of information collected include the users’ system configuration,
number of times and timestamps for when the content was accessed, location information, and even
very personal data like contact lists; worse, several companies have been found to correlate this data
with other user information such as IP addresses, user IDs, gender, and age in order to analyze end
users [26, 37, 41,60, 64,76, 77]. This process of collecting user data and sending it to remote servers is
often done without the knowledge of the user and poses considerable concern.
It has also been discovered that some DRM protections use the same tactics as spyware. In 2005, Mark
Russinovich discovered a rootkit on his computer that had been installed from a Sony-BGM audio CD.
Subsequent research found that the malware installed even without consent, transmitted information
about the user’s activities, took steps to both resist detection and removal, and compromised the
security of the systems it had been installed on. The included End User License Agreement (EULA)
was intentionally vague and misleading about the function of the software, offering only that it was
intended to protect the audio files on the CD [25,31].
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While there were sanctions against Song-BGM for their role in the unwanted intrusion of user com-
puters, many other negative components of DRM are supported by the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), which prohibits the use or sharing of circumvention tools with some limited exceptions.
This means that our ability to exercise fair use rights, protect our privacy, and enjoy other consumer
rights that we were once able to take for granted are at risk. We cannot count on content distributors
to be honest, considerate, accountable, or transparent; instead we must seek to rebuild a framework
under which the rights of users can be reclaimed and balanced against the needs of content providers.
This paper begins with a brief overview of how DRM technologies are being used to limit consumer
rights. Next we show how this code is combined with a legal component, including the use of contrac-
tual agreements, to further narrow user rights. Providing a summary of the legal history, we build up
to the current legal environment surrounding DRM in the US. We conclude with our proposal for how
DRM policies should be changed to better balance the interests of copyright holders and the public.
2 Code Context
To show why there is a pressing need for a form of DRM that incorporates fair use and other consumer
rights, we share several ways in which DRM currently imposes on these rights. In addition to the
limitation or removal of many fair use rights, we look at other actions taken through DRM by content
distributors, such as invalidating or removing access to purchased content, retroactively restricting
DRM privileges after purchase, the reduction of user privacy by collecting and sending personal
information through processes that “phone home,” and some malware-like tactics used by DRM coders
to control users’ systems.
One issue with DRM protected content is that of renewability, or the ability to delete or alter features
after purchase. An ebook seller, Fictionwise, used a third-party supplier of DRM encrypted ebooks,
Overdrive, to supply approximately 300,000 electronic book titles to its users. Providing only 30
days of warning to customers, Overdrive’s servers were shut down on January 30, 2009. The files
already downloaded continued to work but the purchases were invalidated, removing the ability of
users to transfer content to a new device or obtain a replacement if the original file was lost or
deleted. Fictionwise stated in their FAQs online that “Fictionwise strives to maintain your purchases
indefinitely, but our terms of service do not guarantee they will be available forever. Forever is a long
time. [. . .] We do not have legal control of those third party servers. If those third party servers ‘go
dark’ for one reason or another, we have no way to continue delivering those files. It is important
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to note that other ebook retailers such as Barnes and Noble, Gemstar, and Amazon.com’s original
ebook store circa 2004 did not make any effort to maintain long term customer access to purchased
material when they shut down their ebook operations in the past. They announced a time period for
final download then shut down the servers” [15,21,71].
Ebook users faced another issue with renewability when Amazon deleted copies of George Orwell’s
1984 and Animal Farm as well as some works of Ayn Rand from users’ Kindles, rendering user-added
notes and annotations associated with those files useless [69,71]. Amazon refunded the purchases, but
left users angry that the company had the ability to retroactively modify user access to purchased
content.
Short of removing entire works, some users experienced changes in DRM privileges after purchasing
content. The Author’s Guild fought to force Amazon to block text-to-speech privileges on a title-
by-title basis from the Kindle [5], and Amazon ultimately agreed to remove the functionality from
already purchased titles on users’ devices at the request of publishers [71].
This issue is not confined to ebooks; consumers of music and video games have faced similar losses. In
2008, music services offered by MSN, Yahoo! Music, and Walmart Music announced that they would
be shutting down their DRM servers and that users would no longer be able to transfer songs to new
devices or access purchased content after changing operating systems. Customer reactions caused
MSN and Walmart to announce a delay in their shutdown date and Yahoo! to offer compensation
to their customers [15]. Users of Apple’s iTunes service also experienced DRM privilege restrictions.
Prior to April 2004, the iTunes music store allowed users to burn purchased music on up to 10 CDs.
Apple later issued an update to iTunes reducing that limit to only 7 allowable copies [14]. In another
case, Epic Game’s Gears of War software came with a digital certificate that expired on January
28, 2009, about three years after the game was released. Users who had legally purchased the game
became unable to use the product until the creators fixed the certificate (or until they realized that
changing their system clock tricked the game into registering the certificate as still valid). Ironically,
users with a pirated copy of the game did not have this problem [15,17].
Another consumer cost of DRM is loss of privacy. DRM has “the potential to facilitate an unprece-
dented degree of surveillance of consumers’ reading, listening, viewing and browsing habits” [6]. This
may be even more intrusive in the mobile realm, where “smartphones are often on and tethered to
their user, transmitting rich data to the app developers. Users of mobile devices are vulnerable to
privacy intrusion and abuse by numerous entities, app developers, analytic services and advertising
networks. These entities could have access to sensitive information, including a user’s location, con-
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tacts, identity, messages and photos” [56]. A Wall Street Journal Investigation on the topic found
that “these phones don’t keep secrets. They are sharing this personal data widely and regularly” [77].
In fact, some users reported to have run tests discovering that several Pinch Media enabled iPhone
apps were storing and sending back to Pinch Media’s servers (“phoning home”) combinations of the
following data: a unique device identifier, iPhone model, OS version, app version, if the iPhone
running the app was jailbroken, if the copy of the app had been pirated, the times and dates when
the app was opened and closed, latitude and longitude of the iPhone, and—if Facebook enabled—the
gender, birth month and day of the user [41, 60]. Flurry Analytics, which has since merged with
Pinch Media, admits in their privacy policy that they collect the following data: “User ID (for your
service), latitude and longitude (obfuscated by Flurry to state/city), gender, age, events, errors, and
page views. Finally, we see the IP address, device type, locale and timezone of the user through the
HTTP request. [. . . ] In addition, we may provide you with the option of exporting raw Flurry data
to your servers such as timestamp, platform, event, and user ID” [26]. Co-founder of Pinch Media,
Greg Yardley, responded to outrage over the discovery that Pinch Media-enabled apps were phoning
home by saying, “Every single person who installs an iPhone application consents to data collection
in advance—it’s right there in the default EULA Apple’s provided so developers don’t have to hire
lawyers before publishing something,” defending that “There’s always a subset of people who don’t
care how useful analytics are, and automatically object to any analytics-providing company. Some
don’t get how analytics make a lot of what they enjoy possible [. . . ] Some do understand this, but
don’t think it’s worth the price of privacy. That’s an honest opinion, and we’ll have to [respectfully]
disagree, although I wonder why such a person would even have a mobile phone to begin with, since
the carriers track things much more personal than we ever will, and are much more likely to share
them”1.
While many times not transparent to users, these activities may indeed be allowed by the EULA,
although often in vague, non-limiting terms. There are many other analytics companies like Flurry,
including Medialet and Mobclix, but it’s often not known to users that some of their apps are running
analytics software, which ones are collecting this data, or the scope of data being obtained [37,53,54,
77].
Although analytics companies defend this process as one in which no personally identifiable informa-
tion is collected, the practice of collecting a device’s unique identifier means that they are able to
1This quote from Greg Yardley was originally found as a comment to an article posted online at
http://gadgets.boingboing.net/2009/04/13/pinch-media-statisti.html#comment-463496). I verified with him via email
communication on November 12, 2013 that it was his comment.
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track users over time. Unlike cookies, this is built into the device and cannot be cleared [77,88]. One
user wrote in response to Pinch Media that “As far as not having personally identifiable information,
the fact is that as soon as I use an app that requires registration of my name or email address, then
my [unique device identifier (UDID)] could be associated with my identify by the developer of this
app. What’s to stop you from gathering this information from developers? Even if you don’t have my
name, the [(UDID)] might as well be my name” [41].
Apps like Facebook, Hipster, and Path, and about a dozen others were found to be uploading user’s
contact lists to their servers in a move later defended by Path as being an industry-standard practice
[33, 34, 55, 64, 76, 88]. Seven popular mobile games created by Storm8 were also criticized for sending
home users’ phone numbers, unique device identifiers, and email addresses, all unencrypted in plain
text. [7,29]. Programs downloaded from an app store are not the only ones potentially collecting user
data, however. One developer discovered that the WebOS side of his Palm Pre device “periodically
uploads information to Palm, Inc” [32], including location data and application usage. Carrier IQ,
software installed on 150 million phones by cell phone companies, was found to be recording keystrokes,
location data, browsing history, application use, battery use, and radio activity [12, 13]. Possibly the
result of an error, it was also found “that keystrokes, text message content and other very sensitive
information is in fact being transmitted from some phones on which Carrier IQ is installed to third
parties” [12].2 Finally, while users may feel comfortable and let their guard down when using iPhone’s
Siri feature, they should keep in mind that it collects user data in order to have a better context for
the spoken commands and that Apple reserves the right to retain both voice inputs and user data for
their own uses as well as those of their subsidiaries [2].
Along with contact lists, it is also possible for mobile apps to access and copy entire photo albums
without the user’s knowledge or explicit opt-in, as found on both Apple and Android devices [8, 9].
In addition, Black Hat researcher, Nicolas Seriot, developed a proof-of-concept iPhone app that was
able to collect and send home the following data: phone number, address book contents, recent
Safari searches, YouTube history, email account data including full name and email address, unique
device identifier, SIM card serial number, and International Mobile Subscriber Identity [72]. Spyware
under the name of FinFisher was found to be able to “secretly turn on a device’s microphone, track its
2Security researcher Trevor Eckhart, who discovered the Carrier IQ rootkit software, was sent a Cease & Desist
notice from Carrier IQ citing copyright infringement and demanding “that Eckhart turn over contact information for
every person who had obtained the files from him, and that he replace his analysis with a statement—written for him by
Carrier IQ—disavowing his research” [39]. Ultimately the Electronic Frontier Foundation took up his case and concluded
“that Carrier IQ’s real goal [was] to suppress Eckhart’s research and prevent others from verifying his findings,” one risk
of abuse of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
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location and monitor e-mails, text messages, and voice calls” [73] on a range of mobile devices including
the iPhone and BlackBerry.3 While these examples show what technology is currently possible in the
realm of mobile devices, these activities may be illegal based on current EULAs. However, it raises the
question of how far companies could take the terms in their user agreements. Certainly a line must be
drawn beyond which courts in the US would consider such terms to be unreasonable, unconscionable,
and ultimately illegal.
The phenomenon of protected content collecting personal data and “phoning home” isn’t limited to
mobile apps. In 2005, it was discovered that Song-BMG’s copy-protected CDs were transmitting
personal information without the user’s knowledge or consent [31]. Specifically, the DRM systems
implemented by Song-BMG “were designed to contact a vendor Web site whenever the user inserted a
protected disc. The ostensible purpose of this was to download images or advertisements that would
be displayed while the music played, but it also created entries in the vendor’s Web server log, noting
the users’ IP addresses, disc inserted, and the times and dates it was inserted” [25].
On top of this, the discs performed undisclosed installation of software onto consumer’s computers.
The discs shipped with two versions of DRM, one called XCP (extended copy protection) another
under the name of MediaMax. XCP was a rootkit that cloaked its presence by modifying the system
to hide the fact that it was running and to make it challenging to remove. The MediaMax version
also resisted detection and removal, installing itself even if the user declined the terms in the EULA.
Researchers Halerman and Felten concluded that their case study on Song-BMG revealed “similarities
between DRM and malicious software such as spyware, the temptation of DRM vendors to adopt
malware tactics, the tendency of DRM to erode privacy, the strategic use of access control to control
markets, the failure of ad hoc designs, and the force of differing incentives in shaping behavior and
causing conflict” [31]. Another researcher pointed out that “Even if Sony BMG disclosed the existence
of this software in the End Users’ License Agreement (EULA), the agreement did not disclose the
real nature of the software being installed, the security and privacy risks it created, the practical
impossibility of uninstalling and many other potential problems for the user’s computer” [50].
The third complaint with the tactics used by Song-BMG was that of limited portability. After pur-
chase, users learned that they were limited by the number of digital copies of the material that they
could create, that they had to use Sony’s proprietary media player to play the content on their com-
puters, and that they weren’t permitted to convert music to common digital formats such as that
used by iTunes. Ultimately this meant that the files were only compatible with Sony and Microsoft
3This is not just a worry for the future; some Android and iPhone apps from their respective app stores have already
been found to secretly activate cell phone microphones, including Color, Shopkick, and IntoNow [16, 64].
6 of 26
portable players and unusable with other devices like the iPod.
The investigations of Song-BMG copy-protected disks revealed several ways in which content owners
do not make limitations transparent to users before purchase. Here, consumers were only made aware
of portability issues after inserting the disks into their computers and were unaware that Sony’s media
player would be serving advertisements while they played their paid content [50].
Consumers of ebooks also often do not know what limitations they will face until after they have
purchased the content. They may be surprised to learn that features such as read-aloud and use with
third party programs can be disabled on a title-to-title basis. While this may be a minor inconvenience
to some users, it could be a big problem for those with disabilities who rely on those features in order
to make use of the content, such as users who need the use of an included read-aloud function or the
ability to interface with third party software that can do so [71]. “The advent of digital technology
makes it easier than ever for disabled people to enjoy the same media as people without disabilities.
A digital book can be read aloud by a blind user’s computer, sparing her the need to wait until [a]
volunteer can be found to record an audio version. Indeed, for the first time the blind can enjoy
newspapers at the same time as the sighted, simply by ‘reading’ them through a Web-browser that
reads the articles aloud to them, or exports them via a Braille terminal. [. . . ] However, DRM systems
stymie these activities. Adobe’s ebooks come with the capacity to be read aloud by a computer, but
allow authors to switch this capability off. Other ebook technologies lack this capability altogether,
and actively prevent interoperability with third party software such as text-to-speech programs” [14].
DRM code is able to limit access and interoperability, locking consumers out of expected functionality
or that which could be offered through third-party vendors. “In a few words, the restrictions imposed
by technological measures are frequently unclear to consumers. This lack of information can induce
consumers to make buying decisions which they would not have made had they been better informed”
[50]. In order to maintain fairness where DRM is used, these limitations should be disclosed before
purchase to enable consumers to make informed buying decisions.
Digital restrictions like these combined with anti-circumvention legislation have been criticized for
limiting or removing fair use rights. Passed in 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
made the circumvention of copyright protection mechanisms illegal, with the temporary exception
of a limited number of classes of works [48, 82]. One effect of the DMCA has been to narrow fair
use rights further than the provisions (otherwise) made in law for copyright holders. Succinctly,
“Copyright owners can effectively eliminate fair use by utilizing DRM systems sanctioned under the
DMCA and litigating against anyone who tampers with those measures. Thus, re-writing the copyright
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fundamentals developed by Congress and courts over more than a century” [70].
One harm of this can be seen in the area of scholarly research. For example, while motion picture
excerpts can now legally be obtained through DRM circumvention for the purpose of commentary,
criticism, or educational uses in accordance with the most recent DMCA exemptions4, there are still
many other possible educational purposes for circumvention of technological barriers that are not
permitted [48]. This includes the loss of ability to digitally analyze protected content, such as using
third-party software to search and analyze text in books, thematic searches of musical scores, or
analyses of computer programs [1].
3 Legal Context
In this section, we show examples of terms being included in EULAs such as those prohibiting users
from engaging in class-action lawsuits, requiring that users allow collection of their personal data, and
even those that force users to relinquish fair use rights. Several case studies in the US are presented
and compared to the way similar agreements are being handled in the European Union (EU). The EU
has established some fundamental consumer rights and taken action against companies that require
EULAs with unconscionable terms; in the US, although several legal attempts have been made to
limit the ability of contractual agreements to force users to waive rights they would otherwise have
enjoyed under copyright law, we have not seen the same success in this area as Europe. To establish
the current legal atmosphere surrounding DRM and user agreements, current and failed bills on the
topic are presented. Finally, a comparison is made showing the overarching differences guiding privacy
protection and data flow legislation for members nations of the European Union to those in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the latter of which includes the United States.
The current legal environment in the US is perceived by many to be skewed unfairly in favor of
copyright holders. In addition to the code-based restrictions imposed on users by DRM technology,
further rights can be taken away through licenses and contracts, such as End User License Agreements
(EULAs) [11,14,15,28,49,51,67,68,70].
4There is a catch to the DMCA exemptions, however; they are only valid for a period of three years, at which
time some can be renewed but there is no guarantee. In the words of the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, “In
each rulemaking proceeding, the Register and Librarian review the proposed classes de novo. The fact that a class
previously has been designated creates no presumption that redesignation is appropriate. While in some cases earlier
legal analysis by the Register may be relevant to analyzing a proposed exemption, the proponent of a class must still
make a persuasive factual showing with respect to the three-year period currently under consideration” [48].
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As of this writing, some EULAs include terms to prohibit users from participating in a class-action
lawsuit or to require users to allow collection of their personal data. Consenting to the Sony Playsta-
tion Vita System of Software License Agreement (Version 1.1) [74] or the most recent PayPal User
Agreement [62], for example, means that the user waives the right to engage in a class-action lawsuit
against the company—unless a written notification requesting the retention that right is sent within
30 days of accepting the agreement. Facebook retains the right to log and use data on users including
the IP address, date, and time of all logins and logouts; messages sent between users; a history of
conversations through Facebook Chat; all notifications and whether the user had email and text en-
abled or disabled for each; any photos uploaded to a Facebook account (presumably even those later
deleted); as well as a history of other sites visited. Facebook is only one of many services that collect
user data. The iTunes 10.7 license agreement, for example, states that “If you opt in to diagnostic
and usage collection, you agree that Apple and its subsidiaries and agents may collect, maintain,
process and use diagnostic, technical, usage and related information, including but not limited to in-
formation about your computer, system and application software, and peripherals, that is gathered
periodically” [3] (emphasis added). Users are opted in by default, and what a user must to do to opt
out is not immediately clear or disclosed in the agreement.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation warns that “Companies have a lot of leeway about what goes into
the privacy policy. They can use vague, overbroad language so they can collect lots of data about
users, share it with affiliates, sell it to marketers, or provide it to the government upon request. And
even a strong privacy policy is little consolation; a privacy policy can change at any time, so today’s
protective language could be tomorrow’s permissive exceptions” [38]. Considering that most Americans
believe that their information is being kept private when they see the term “privacy policy” [78], that
the common attitude of consumers toward EULAs is to select that they agree without reading the
terms [88], and that the terms in these contracts are unilaterally determined and dictated, users
today find themselves in a very poor position with respect to the companies drafting these license
agreements.
The European Union has established some fundamental consumer rights and taken action against
companies that require EULAs with “unconscionable” terms. Some terms that have been argued to
be unfair include those that allow the copyright holder to modify the agreement without notice, to
change the rights restrictions on already purchased files, to limit interoperability with other software
or devices, to disclaim responsibility for any viruses or other damage that could result to the user’s
computer system through use of their services or products, as well as other misleading or unfair
behavior including terms users likely would not have accepted had they understood what was included
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[27, 50].
In the U.S. however, EULAs in the form of click-through or shrink-wrap agreements are being upheld
in courts (although not consistently). A high profile case illustrating this was that of Blizzard vs.
bnetd.org. Vivendi-Universal’s Blizzard Entertainment alleged that software created by bnetd.org
allowing users to play Blizzard games over the Internet was only made possible by the defendant’s use
of reverse engineering, a violation of Blizzard’s ELUA. A court ruled in 2005 that even if this would
have fallen under fair use, bnetd.org waived that right by agreeing to Blizzard’s ELUA [15,83].
Even though some legal attempts have been made to limit the ability of contractual agreements to
force users to waive rights they could have otherwise enjoyed under Copyright Law, the U.S. has
not seen the same success in this area as Europe. In 1997, Rep. Boucher introduced the Digital
Era Copyright Enhancement Act (105th Congress Bill H.R. 3048) to Congress as an alternative to
the restrictive proposals under the DMCA; however, it died after being referred to a subcommittee
in 1998, ultimately losing out to the DMCA proposal. Some of the major differences between H.R.
3048 and the DMCA include that the former took fair uses into consideration by only prohibiting the
alteration or removal of DRM restrictions when done for the purpose of infringement. Further, H.R.
3048 would have prohibited the ability of copyright owners to limit fair use rights through shrink-wrap
or click-through agreements [6, 46,47].
Another bill proposed to establish greater consumer rights with respect to DRM, The Consumer,
Schools, and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act of 2003, was introduced by Senator
Brownback and supported by the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing
Machinery (USACM). Among the terms proposed were to promote greater public transparency when
DRM is used to protect digital content, greater privacy rights for users, and prohibitions on the
government from mandating the use of any specific copy-protection technologies. This bill also died
in Congress.
“Pro-digital-consumer legislation has enjoyed no great success in U.S. The most famous consumer-
rights legislation proposed in the recent time, the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act (DMCRA),
has been introduced into Congress three times without success” [50]. First introduced in 2003, the goals
of DMCRA were to restore fair use rights to users by allowing the circumvention of copy protection
measures for the purpose of scientific research or when “such circumvention does not result in an
infringement of the copyright in the work” [44]. It would have also allowed the distribution of hardware
and software enabling such circumvention if there existed a “significant noninfringing use” for the
technology. It would have also required greater transparency of limitations through the clear labeling
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of copy-protected compact discs.
Nations take different approaches to privacy protection, ranging from a “strong ‘rights-based’ approach
[as] embodied in the [EU] Data Protection Directive, to the US preference for relying on market forces
rather than the law to protect personal information” [49]. The United States is one of 21 member
economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that have agreed to the APEC Privacy
Framework in order to create region-wide compatibility of privacy policies and data flow [4]. “The
significance of the twenty-one APEC economies adopting common information privacy standards
cannot be doubted. The APEC economies are located on four continents, account for more than a
third of the world’s population, half its GDP, and almost half of world trade” [30].
One complaint with APEC Privacy Framework is that it allows collected data to be used for any
“compatible or related purposes” and does not suggest that collection should be the least necessary.
Although APEC member nations can implement stronger regional laws, doing so seems to be dis-
couraged: the forward to the Framework states that “Member Economies, consistent with the APEC
Privacy Framework and any existing domestic privacy protections, should take all reasonable and ap-
propriate steps to identify and remove unnecessary barriers to information flows and avoid the creation
of any such barriers” [4]. Showing a preference for allowing data flow over protecting privacy, “The
Preamble speaks of ‘ensuring’ free flow of information but only of ‘encouraging’ privacy protection.
The final points in the Preamble refer to free flow of information as ‘essential’, but do not accord this
status to privacy protection. These examples of terminology indicate how the Framework has a bias
against privacy protection in favor of free flow of information” [30].
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4 Recommendations for Improving DRM Design
We propose several changes for DRM systems and expand on basic principles of good DRM design.
(1). Copyright Balance: In line with the idea that DRM should only be used to reinforce existing
copyright laws and not to add further restrictions, we recommend a starting point for which fair
use rights and copyright protections can be balanced.
With copyright holders having a possible conflict of interest with fair use rights, they should
not be in charge of determining if access should be blocked through the use of DRM. “A fair use
is by definition unauthorized and therefore does not require interaction with or compensation
to the copyright holder. Indeed, many legitimate fair uses, including criticism, commentary,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research, might well conflict with the interests of the
copyright holder” [18]. A minimal level of access then should be required of DRM for fair use
rights.
The United States Copyright Offices lists the following four criteria as those used to make fair
use determinations: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work” [80]. This vague nature of fair use makes it a legal gray area and difficult, if
not impossible, to translate into code [22]. However, rather than allowing copyright holders
the option to eliminate these rights, previous legal cases should be used to establish reasonable
boundaries within which DRM should operate. Focusing on the quantitative component of the
third criterion used to determine fair use, we looked at summaries of legal cases involving fair
use to calculate the percentage of overall content taken from the copyrighted work. Based on
cases where it was possible to assign a percentage to the amount of the content used [75,84,85],
we recommend that a minimum of 1% of text, audio, and video be made available through DRM
for copying purposes. Note that this 1% recommendation would not imply that any use of that
amount of material would fall under fair use (or that any greater percentage would not), but
rather to serve as a starting point for finding a reasonable balance between adequate content
protection and better access to fair use rights.
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We also seek to have DRM coders include expirations for their protections that correspond with
copyright expirations; this will ensure that public domain works are not unfairly limited by
(possibly no longer supported) DRM technologies.
(2). Privacy: Although some data collection is needed to complete transactions, the collection, stor-
age, and redistribution of personal information should only be allowed as is necessary for the
proper functioning of the DRM system. Further, user agreements should not require users to
relinquish privacy when the data is not necessary for the DRM system. Based on principles
of privacy-aware design [92], we suggest that DRM adheres to the following framework: DRM
systems provide a full disclosure of data collection, users must first consent to any data collec-
tion through acknowledgments and opting-in, the amount of personal data collected is minimal
and only taken when there is a functional requirement to do so, the identification of data with
individuals is minimized, and data is stored only when there is a functional requirement for its
retention.
At minimum, DRM must adhere to the following guidelines when data collection is involved:
maintain transparency, only use data in the context within which it was collected, provide
an ability for users to access and amend personally identifying data, provide the option to
permanently delete data when a user wants to leave a service, securely handle and store data,
and respect reasonable limits on what is appropriate to collect [20,35,37,40,43,57,88].
• Transparency: A final commission report issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
advocates for better transparency for users. They urge that “Companies should increase
the transparency of their data practices; privacy notices should be clearer, shorter, and
more standardized to enable better comprehension and comparison of privacy practices;
companies should provide reasonable access to the consumer data they maintain and the
extent of access should be proportionate to the sensitivity of the data and the nature
of its use; and all stakeholders should expand their efforts to educate consumers about
commercial data privacy practices” [20]. Users should be made aware of exactly what data
is being accessed, how long the data will be stored, how the data will be used, and where
the data will be shared [35,43].
• Respect for Context: The Electronic Frontier Foundation suggests that “Applications that
collect data should only use or share that data in a manner consistent with the context in
which the information was provided. If contact data is collected for a ‘find friends’ feature,
for example, it should not be released to third parties or used to e-mail those contacts
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directly. When the developer wants to make a secondary use of the data, it must obtain
explicit opt-in permission from the user” [35].
• Right to Access and Amend: “There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about the person” [43].
• Right to Delete: “Particularly where privacy tradeoffs have not been made clear, consumers
need the ability to change their minds and walk away from a service. While the Federal
Trade Commission has so far focused upon improving consumers’ positions ex ante, in-
creasingly we need to consider ex post interventions, such as a right to delete information
associated with an account, so that the consumer can exit whole” [88]. In the case of social
media, “A user should have the right to delete data or her entire account from a social
network service. And we mean really delete. It is not enough for a service to disable access
to data while continuing to store or use it. It should be permanently eliminated from the
service’s servers” [57].
• Security: An FTC report found that “the range of privacy-related harms is more expansive
than economic or physical harm or unwarranted intrusions and that any privacy framework
should recognize additional harms that might arise from unanticipated uses of data. These
harms may include the unexpected revelation of previously private information, including
both sensitive information (e.g., health information, precise geolocation information) and
less sensitive information (e.g., purchase history, employment history) to unauthorized
third parties” [20]. To protect users, data should be encrypted whenever possible, [37]
including during transit, during storage, against external attacks, and “against the threat
of employees abusing their power to view sensitive information” [35].
• Limitations: “Consumers have a right to reasonable limits on the personal data that com-
panies collect and retain” [40]. EULAs should not be used to take advantage of consumers
and allow data collection that users would not want to share.
• Privacy by Design: “Companies should promote consumer privacy throughout their orga-
nizations and at every stage of the development of their products and services; companies
should incorporate substantive privacy protections into their practices, such as data secu-
rity, reasonable collection limits, sound retention and disposal practices, and data accuracy;
and companies should maintain comprehensive data management procedures through the
life cycle of their products and services” [20].
There would need to be a legal component in order to gain compliance, as it is not always in a
company’s best interest to provide this level of privacy. A UC Berkeley Law study found that
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“Even when companies know that consumers want more privacy, firms can have incentives to
code in privacy-invasion options by default. Firms may also have incentives to hide the tus-
sle” [88].
(3). Consumer Protection: In addition to fair use rights, DRM should not be used to restrict other
user rights or to disadvantage consumers. This includes prohibiting unconscionable terms in
user agreements, requiring transparency for DRM restrictions before the sale of content, and
demanding accountability. Currently, many consumers cannot determine which actions will be
permitted while using a specific digital content (such as read-aloud for an ebook) until after the
purchase has been completed, putting consumers in a poor position with respect to the content
distributors.
• Renewability: Manufacturers/suppliers should not be allowed to further narrow rights of
consumers post-purchase [65,71].
• Transparency: “Consumers must be able to judge the quality and characteristics of complex
technological products and services. There is little doubt that disclosure and transparency
are effective means of protecting their rights and interests, especially in cases of information
asymmetry” [50].
• Accountability: Developers should be responsible for the hardware and software they create,
including any possible harm that may result from using the content or device [37]. To
increase accountability, exemptions should be granted through the DMCA for security
research and compliance validation.
As copyright holders are not inherently interested in preserving these rights, as shown by current
market trends, legal policies would need to be established to monitor DRM and contractual
agreements in order to protect consumers.
(4). Competition:
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has argued that some DRM-based technologies—such
as DVD Players—do little to ensure protection of the content; they make the argument that
DRM here is being used more to eliminate competition than piracy [14,15]. The EFF points out
that some of the DVD Content Control Association’s (DVD-CCA) technologies, such as CSS,
have been cracked for years. Through licensing agreements though, the DVD-CCA is able to
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require innovators seeking to implement new features for DVDs to first gain permission through
a negotiation process involving movie studios and big computer companies.5
Some copyright holders are able to use licensing agreements to maintain control over technologies,
limit interoperability, and thus limit competition. To solve these issues, public policy needs to be
adapted to encourage better interoperability among the various DRM approaches and to enable
more competition.
(5). Research and Public Discourse: DRM systems and the laws that protect them should not inter-
fere with non-infringing scholarship, as doing so impedes scientific progress. An example of this
impact on the academic community was seen when the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI)
forbid the publication of a paper by Felten et. al. that revealed weaknesses in the watermarking
standards proposed by the former. SDMI claimed that the paper was an illegal circumvention
technology, forcing Felten to seek a court decision in order to allow the publication. To avoid
similar threats, he used the legal advice of several attorneys while working on a later publi-
cation, writing that “sadly, research of this type does seem to require support from a team of
lawyers” [31].
Although the DMCA has offered exemptions for specific categories of encryption research and
security testing—allowing legal circumvention for some researchers—these relaxations in the
DMCA regulations were limited and in effect for only three years; at the conclusion of that time,
the Librarian of Congress makes new determinations, providing no guarantees of continuing to
protect these classes of scholarship. Additionally, not all types of academic research have been
granted exemptions. Circumventing DRM for the purposes of thematic searches and analysis
of musical scores or word frequency analysis, for example, have not been granted the same
privileges.
5 Conclusion
DRM is used to mitigate the losses content owners face due to piracy, but this technology also enables
copyright holders to overreach their rights and narrow those of consumers. The current legal and
technological landscape shows that we cannot rely on market forces alone to find a fair balance
5The interested reader is encouraged to learn more about actions taken by the DVD-CCA against Kalei-
descape and RealNetworks by looking at E. Bangeman, DVD Licensing Group to Vote on Closing Copy-
ing Loophole, http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/11/dvd-licensing-group-to-vote-on-closing-copying-loophole/
(Nov. 5, 2007) and G. Sandoval, RealNetworkds Set to File Appeal in RealDVD Case, http://news.cnet.com/8301-
31001_3-10369812-261.html (Oct. 7, 2009).
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between the rights of users and those of copyright holders. We encourage legislators to safeguard
users rights by developing a legal backing for the recommendations presented in this paper. We also
encourage developers of DRM to remain mindful of these suggestions and to carefully consider the
impact their technology has on consumer rights, including fair use and privacy.
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